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Cyprus Conflict and the Distorted Facts

by on 05/12/2009

A POST-MODERNIST (STRUCTURALIST) STUDY OF THE DOMINANT GREEK CYPRIOT DISCOURSES

scanvol13.no1 Cyprus Conflict is one of the problematic and long-lasting conflicts that has kept the international community busy for a long time. The conflict has been in the UN’s agenda for 30 years. The UN peace keeping forces (UNFICYP) have been in Cyprus to obstruct violent confrontation of the two communities since 1964.

In this paper, we are going to analyze some texts – mainly Greek Cypriot, and try to account on the type of discursive practices used by the Greek Cypriot governments both in the 1960’s and in the 1990’s.

 

We shall use discursive practices in a hermenutical approach to account on the change of the Greek Cypriot government’s 1960’s main discourse after 1974 (Greek coup d’at and the successive Turkish military intervention/invasion) which created a distorted reality and how the current discourse influences the negotiation process, between the two communities, under the auspices of the UN.

Before we analyze the texts it is useful to give a brief history of what happened in Cyprus between the periods 1960 and 1974 from the perspectives of two sides, so that the events and concepts in the texts will be clear to the reader.

In 1960 the island was granted its independence by the British. With the Treaties of Zurich, London and Nicosia, an independent, bi-communal state was established in 1960. The state, i.e., the Republic of Cyprus, was comprised of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities which had the status of co-founders and equal partners, having 20% and 80% of the population, respectively. A constitution which safeguards the rights of the people of both communities was established. According to the constitution, the President was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot; the Turks was to get 30% of the seats in the parliament while the Greek Cypriots 70%; the President and the Vice-President was to have veto power separately on all governmental issues; each community was to have the right to decide by itself on issues concerning only that community; issues concerning both sides were to require separate majority of each community in the parliament.

It was a compromise solution by both sides among the other alternatives: two separate states, a condominium, division of the island between Greece and Turkey, or continued British rule.

The life of this partnership (i.e., the Republic of Cyprus), however, lasted only three years. It is very difficult to find the real story of what really happened after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Each side has its own version of the history and the events in these two separate histories have internal coherence that make them logical within each version.

In 1963 the Greek Cypriot side wanted to make 13 amendments to the Constitution of 1960 which, according to the Turkish Cypriots, would deprive the Turkish Cypriots of the status of equal partner of the Republic. Even eight of them were so fundamental that they were included in the unalterable Basic Articles of the Constitution, such as that of [Turkish Cypriots’] having veto power over governmental decisions, of having their own municipalities, etc. The main objective of the amendments, according to the Turkish Cypriots was to put the Turkish Cypriots into the status of minority (from the status of co-founder and politically equal partner of the Republic) – i.e., to change the bi-communal republic into a unitary state in which the voting power [of the Greek Cypriots] would be paramount.*1.

However, according to the Greek Cypriots, the 1960 Constitution and the international treaties (London, Zurich and Nicosia) were imposed by the external powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) and that they were signed by the Greek Cypriot leadership under force of the Guarantor powers.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the amendments. In one instance the Turkish Cypriots took the issue of “establishing separate municipalities” (Article 173) to the Supreme Constitutional Court. On 25th April 1963 the Court ruled that Article 173 had not been complied with, but President (also Greek Archbishop) Makarios declared that he would ignore it, and did ignore it (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63)*2.

On 21st May the neutral President of the Court who was a West German citizen resigned. At that time, according to the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios dismissed the Turkish Cypriot cabinet ministers, members of the House of Representatives and all the Turkish Cypriot civil servants. He also discharged all the Turkish Cypriot diplomats at the United Nations and in foreign capitals *3.

The story is again different from the Greek Cypriot perspective. They believe that the Turkish Cypriot cabinet ministers and the members of the House left their positions voluntarily in order to protest the Greek Cypriot proposal of the thirteen amendments, and that the Turkish civil servants were forced by those ministers to leave their jobs in order to form a separate Turkish Cypriot administration.

From 1963 to 1974 the Turks were forced into exodus with thousands killed and missing due to Greek junta forces occupying the island supported by local Greek Cypriot militia, according to the Greek Cypriot claim, the Turks chose to migrate and form their homogeneous enclaves. Due to this ethnic cleansing and forced migration, the Turkish Cypriots left their land and homes which constituted 30% of the registered ownership of the island in 1960 and migrated to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves which constituted 3% of the island.

On July 15, 1974 a coup organized and sent forces, from the then military junta regime in, Greece to Cyprus to overthrow the Republic of Cyprus (co-founded by Greeks and Turks on the island) and to unite Cyprus with Greece (this movement been called Enosis in Greek). On July 20, 1974 Turkey, under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) sent troops to the island (code-named Operation Atilla) to drive away the coup d’Zat from Greece.

In the 1960’s the Greek Cypriot leadership wanted to unite the island with Greece (i.e., Enosis). For them, that was perfectly legal and justifiable since they formed 80% of the population. So, basically their struggle was not to establish a bi-communal Republic of Cyprus but to gain the right of self determination so that they can unite with their motherland (Greece).

However, the earlier mentioned Agreements (the 1960 Constitution and the international treaties of London, Zurich and Nicosia) gave the two communities (Turkish and Greek) the right of self governmennt separately and gave both communities in the island the right of “sovereignty” to share*4.

The below texts clearly shows the type of discourse which was dominant among the Greek Cypriot leadership in the 1960’s:

ENOSIS (union with Greece) discourse before 1974 :
“Unless this small Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race..is expelled, the duties of the Eoka *5 can never be considered terminated.”
(President Makarios’ Statement, Circa 1960’s) (Negotiating for Survival. p. 7).

“The aim of the Cyprus struggle was not establishment of a republic. These Agreements only laid the foundations.”
(President Makarios’ Statement, March 13, 1963).

“Union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a republic.”
(President Makarios’ Statement, London TIMES, April 9, 1963).

“It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece.”
(President Makarios’ Statement, Uusi Soumi of Stockholm, September 1963).
“Freedom for us means only the integration of this souther outpost of Hellenism into the national entity.(Greece)..”
(Tasos Papadopoulos’ Statement, October 23, 1967).

“The struggle of Cyprus is the struggle of all Hellenism. Cyprus, where the Greek virtue is being tested, is today the place where the Greek history and Greek struggle are continuing…”
(Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou’s Statement, March 24, 1971).

As can be seen from the above texts, despite the co-founding of the island with Turks and Greeks and the contstituion and the above mentioned international treaties, the island was claimed to be a Greek island by the largest of the two “partners”.

Since the 1963 constitutional crisis the Turks had been absent from the government and they had been living in their forced homogeneous enclaves. So the Greek Cypriot side was enjoying a de facto “unitary state” in terms of government machinery and territory. Also, the Turkish Cypriots were, then forced into the de facto “minority.” Clearly, there was “Enosis Discourse” which dominated the texts that were produced by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

However, when we look at the texts below which were also produced by the Greek Cypriot leadership – yet, this time in the 1990’s, we should be able to distinguish a totally different discourse that dominates the texts:

INVASION AND INDEPENDENCE DISCOURSE AFTER 1974 :
“Independence came to the Cypriots after centuries of foreign rule (British) and after a hard guerrilla war against the colonial power. Makarios, the leader of the anti-colonial struggle, and first President of the Republic of Cyprus, welcomed it as the herald of a new age for the people of Cyprus: According to the 1960 Cyprus constitution, which is still the constitution under which the Cyprus governemnt and house of representatives function and the courts dispense justice, the Turkish Cypriots were guaranteed a privileged position as a minority. They were guaranteed full cultural and religious autonomy and reinforced political representation…”
(Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion, “They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace,” 1991. p.37).

(Disregarding the ethnic cleansing and attempted genocide of the Turks by the Greek forces):

“For hundreds of years Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in social harmony and economic interdependence in the villages and towns of Cyprus). This web of interdependence was only disturbed after protracted and violent attacks against it (referring to Operation Atilla). Even after incidents, planned and instigated to prove that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not live together, ordinary people again and again proved the opposite until they were torn apart by the Attila Operation*6 1974. [The Turkish Cypriots]’ interdependence with the rest of the population of Cyprus is indicated by the fact that until 1974 they lived intermingled in towns and villages all over Cyprus. The mass of Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived and cooperated peacefully in an atmoshpere of religious and cultural tolerance.”
(Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion, “They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace,” 1991. p. 26).

“The Cyprus problem primarily is a question of Turkey’s attack on the Cyprus and invasion of part of its territory which was undoubtedly made possible by foreign powers and the coup which constituted a betrayal.”
(Letter from Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou to EDEK party leader Lyssarides, February 1988)

Here, we see that the “Enosis” discourse was replaced by the “Invasion” discourse. Makarios, who was giving clear and blunt “Enosis” messages and calling on Greek Cypriots to struggle for Enosis in the 1960’s resulting in the deaths and forced exodus of thousands of the islands Turkish inhabitants, been forced to exile into 3% of the island which previously they owned 30% of, is now shown as if he “welcomed [THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS] as the herald of a new age for the people of Cyprus” The Turkish Cypriots are portrayed as the lucky “minority” who enjoyed vast rights and privileges of living under the Republic of Cyprus until 1974, when the Turks from Turkey “invaded” the island.

The general picture one gets from the above texts is that there was “social harmony,” “cultural and religious tolerance” and “interdependence” between the two communities, and that they were living together intermingled. So, the Turkish Cypriots are no longer the “this small Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race..[should be] expelled” (1960’s), but a happy “minority.” There was also a little mention about the “coup d’at” that was sent by Greece to unite the island with Greece (Enosis) which caused the landing of the Turkish troops in Cyprus five days later (July 20, 1974).
So, basically the Turkish “intervention” or “invasion” was shown to happen without any reason which also gives one the implication that it was an action of pure aggression and violence of an imperialist (expansionist) power.

The events which was portrayed above (1963-74) by the 1991 Greek Cypriot government are in great conflict with what Glafcos Clerides (present Greek Cypriot President) stated in his memoirs which were published in the early the 1990’s.
CONTRADICTING DISCOURSES WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY :
“It was by the virtue of equality of powers vested in the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President that the partnership of the two communities was created by the Zurich agreements.”
(“My Deposition” by Glafcos Clerides [former President of Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus], Vol.2, p. 382)

The constitutional crisis of the year 1963 and the following ethnic cleansing and forced exodus of Turks disrupted the constitutional order, the continuity, and the partnership status of the two communities, which was created by the the Zurich Agreements. Because of the disruption of constitutional order a peculiar situation was created by this virtue, the state authority became under the absolute control of the Greeks, and the government continued its international recognition, while on the other hand internally, Turkish enclaved were created within the territory of the Republic, and elementary organization for the purpose of governing and defence of Turkish Cyptiots were established by their community.

After the crisis of 1967 (Kophiniou Crisis) the above disruption of constitutional order became more clear and showed tendencies of permanency. Thus in December 1967, the elementary political-defence organization of the Turks in the enclaves developed into a “temporary Administration” on the basis of a charter, and at the same time the political and military authorities were seperated from the Greek administration.

In the years that followed a steady, stage by stage development is noted in the Turkish administration, with the seperation in its legislative, executive and judicial powers. An administrative organization is created, as well as police force and an army. The increase of the financial resources of the Turkish Cypriots through economic aid from Turkey permitted the functioning of their administration on a more permanent basis, a fact which they made clear, by renaming their “Temporary Turkish Cypriot

Administration” to “Turkish Cypriot Administration, eventually resulting in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in our days. Thus there exist today in Cyprus two poles of power on a seperate geographical basis i.e. the government of the Cyprus Republic, controlling the largest section of the territory of the state and internationally recognized, and the Turkish Cypriot Administration, which controls a very limited area and is not internationally recognized, but has already taken almost all the characteristics of a small state.”
(“My Deposition” by Glafcos Clerides [former President of Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus], Vol.3, pp. 236, 237).

The reality of what actually happened in the 1960’s and 1970’s in the above texts is in great conflict with the portrayal of the reality in the government’s texts in the 1990’s.
Clerides stated that ” lot of wrongs have been done to Turkish Cypriots” and that “the Greek Cypriot side has tried to do away with the agreements and to deprive the Turkish Cypriots from their rights,” that “the Enosis road was followed”. He also stated that the Turkish Cypriots were living in their homogeneous enclaves (3%) and that they were absent from the government of which they were once the equal co-founder *7. This argument is also in conflict with the reality pictured by the Greek Cypriot government in the 1990’s: that the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots were living intermingly in harmony until Turkish “invasion.”

The attempt of Greek Cypriot government to present the Turkish “military operation” similar to the “Invasion” of Kuwait by Iraq was also commented on by Clerides:
“I am sorry that it is wishful thinking and a false dream to believe that we will be successful in such a thing. Such an evaluation is not realistic. Why? There is no Security Council resolution that recognizes that an invasion took place in Cyprus. The Security Council has not condemned Turkey as an occupationist so far. If we are lead to such a recourse, they will tell us at the Security Council that there was a (Greek) coup in Cyprus, the legal government was overthrown, the constitution was violated and Turkey (AS A GUARANTOR POWER) had the right of intervention. The things that count are arguments, not slogans.”
(“My Deposition” by Glafcos Clerides [former President of Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus], Vol.3]

It is clear from all the above texts that there exists today an “Invasion” discourse in the Greek Cypriot government texts which portrays the “facts” of 1960’s and 1970’s very different from the government texts in the 1960’s and early the 1970’s which were mainly dominated by the “Enosis” discourse.

The “Invasion” discourse of the government is challenged by both some internal non-governmental (Greek Cypriot) texts, eg., Clerides’ memoirs, and foreign texts, such as the dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions which agree on the need of UN peace keeping forces in Cyprus and Secretary General reports*7 since 1963.
The “Invasion” discourse puts the Turkish Cypriots into “minority” status and also makes it more difficult to reach a solution to the Cyprus Conflict, based on the UN Resolutions and Secretary General’s “Office of Good Mission.7”

So, the question is “Why does the Greek Cypriot government pursue this discourse which portrays a distorted reality of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and makes the negotiation process harder?”

There might be many different answers to that question drawn from many contemporary theories. However, this writer believes that the question can mostly be tackled with the “Realist Theory” – more specifically with the “Power Politics” – which many theorists and academicians believe to be already dead: The Greek Cypriot government is still recognized as the legal government of the 1960 “Republic of Cyprus.” With the 1983 Resolution 541, the Security Council, concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
The attempt to create a “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus.” This shows that the Greek Cypriot side has a strong position on the table, i.e., being recognized by the UN as the legal government of the “Republic of Cyprus” and the other side (Turkish Cypriots) without any “governmental” title, or with an unrecognized state (i.e., “TRNC”).

The current “status quo” seems to be the Greek Cypriot side’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). To change the current “Invasion” discourse and sit for negotiations, based on the UN resolutions, would not satisfy its “interests” and would deprive it from a considerable power the Greek side now enjoys – as the “legal” government of the whole Cyprus.

If we look at the following text of the UN Resolution 649 (March 12, 1990), it will be clear to demonstrate what the Greek Cypriot government has to give up to change its present “Invasion” discourse which obstructs a solution based on the UN Resolutions:
The Security Council “Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutual acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects … and to cooperate, on equal footing, with the Secretary General…”
(UN Resolution 649, March 12, 1990).

Therefore, for a UN-based solution, the “Invasion” discourse should be modified to accommodate the following points of the UN Resolution:
* give up the “unitary state” concept for a “bi-zonal” “federation”
* give up its argument that the Turkish Cypriots are a “minority” and accept the concept of “bi-communality” and,
*negotiate with them on “equal footing”

As can be understood from the above UN resolution (649), it would put the Greek Cypriot side into a troubled position if it pursued the Enosis discourse (union with Greece) in the 1990’s. The “invasion” discourse, although in opposition with the UN Resolution, at least gives some room for modification in certain conditions *8 and that it can be seen as one side is trying to strengthen its hand on the negotiation table – that is, one can argue that it is giving up a lot in the negotiation, so that it can demand more concessions from the other side.

As we stated earlier, the “Invasion” discourse can be modified to accommodate itself to a UN proposed solution in certain cases. However, there is another powerful discourse within the Greek Cypriot community which, although not widely popular, is capable of blocking the way to a negotiated solution. This discourse is a mixture of the 1960’s Enosis discourse and the government’s post-1974 “Invasion” discourse. It borrowed the idea of “union of Cyprus with Greece” from the Enosis discourse and the claims that “Turkish invasion was an act of pure aggression and violence” from the “Invasion” discourse:

CONTINUATION OF PRE-1974 DISCOURSE INTERTWINED WITH THE INVASION DISCOURSE TODAY :

“Turks are a barbarous people. They are the last barbarians of civilization. A people with violent instincts and a thirst for blood. We rather live with savage animals than the Turks. Until the Turks digest that Cyprus is Greek they can live in this country only as a minority. And our slogan can not be anything else but “best Turk is a dead Turk.” The union of Cyprus with Greece is the only democratic solution for the Cyprus problem. No to the talks, no to the federation, Enosis and let channels fill with the flow of blood.”
(Excerpt appeared in Philelephteros, November 11, 1990)

“If the Cretan Greeks (given as example because the Cretan Greeks ethnically cleansed the island of its Turkish population since Greek independence) were living in Cyprus today not a Turkish Cypriot would have been in the North.
(Statement of the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard General Siradakis, Selides Magazine, October 3, 1992).

I see the fate of Greece and Cyprus as being intertwined. It would not be realistic to think that Cyprus can today fight for a prolonged period of time without Greece or that Greece is not interested in the fate of Cyprus. Because what is Cyprus? is it not Greece. I say to the Greeks who come here “The place that you have come to is not a foreign place, it is Greece.'”
(Statement of the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard General Siradakis, Selides Magazine, October 3, 1992).

The discourse in the above texts (especially the first one) is much more dangerous than the “Invasion” discourse. Here, there is no room for a negotiated solution based on the UN proposals. Instead it suggests a very “BLOODY” solution in the name of “DEMOCRACY” – i.e., “Enosis.” It makes one think of ‘how a “barbarous”, instinctively “violent”, less-than-the-“savage”- “animals,” “Turks” such as this writer, can be incorporated as a “minority” in a “democratic solution”!

The answer has already been provided: by a “bloody” way. Although the above discourse is not widely popular among the Greek Cypriots, it is not discouraged by the government either. That gives the impression to the “other side” (Turks) that the Greek Cypriot government is actually supporting that discourse, which also plays a big role in the failure of the negotiations.

From the above study we got the evidence that there is at least one main “discourse” that dominates Greek Cypriot government’s global policy towards a certain issue:
In the 1960’s and early the 1970’s the dominant discourse in the Greek Cypriot government policies towards the Cyprus Conflict was the “Enosis” discourse. It greatly helped to prepare and execute the 1974 coup sent by Greek military regime. Failure of that action (the coup) or, rather the defeat of the coup by Turkish military operation created another powerful discourse (the “Invasion” discourse) that dominated the future policies of the Greek Cypriot government.

With the above study, we tried also, to account on the failure of the UN sponsored negotiations in terms of the Greek Cypriot “Invasion” discourse. However, that is only part of the explanation. Because there are many discursive practices within the above mentioned events with texts (especially government texts) that are in opposition to the UN proposed solutions to the Cyprus Conflict.

As a matter of fact, the most recent proposal of the UN to the two communities of Cyprus is to implement a series of “Confidence-Building-Measures” that will decrease the lack of trust between the two communities which, according to this writer, fostered by the “dominant discourses” of the two communities leaderships.

The Confidence-Building-Measures of the UN call on the two communities to give more chance to their people to come together and establish more channels of communication through “joint committees,” “joint workshops,” “joint cultural events,” etc. This, we believe, is an implication that the first-tract diplomacy of the political leaders has failed due to its dominant discursive practice. The second- and third-tract diplomacy of the people (rather than the leaders) might help to create new discursive practices that can open the way to a successful negotiated solution.

1. Stephen, Michael (1986). “Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island”, Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.

3. To cut the channel of the Turkish Cypriots to present their case to the world.

4. Each community didn’t have the right of “self determination” separately. An indivisible “sovereignty” was given to both communities to share.

5. The Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization which was originally formed to drove the British colonizers away from the island.

6. The name of the July 20, 1974 Turkish military operation.

7. “Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on equal footing” (The UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council, S/21183, March 8, 1990).

8. In 1986, some Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, threatened to recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” if the negotiations fail to give a solution. So, the possibility of a recognition of the “TRNC” is a condition which forces the Greek Cypriot government to modify its “Invasion” discourse to reach a UN-based solution – since the recognition of the “TRNC” is worse than the current UN proposed federal solution for the Greek Cypriot side.

The above analysis was written some years ago, higlighting the events of the Cyprus Conflict we have been witnessing for over three decades.

If we are to forget the above events, aims, ambitions, ethnic cleansing and attempted genocide of the islands Turkish people by the Greeks, and even neglegt the fact that Turks have been co-inhabitants of the island since 1571 (considering that many people started to inhabit new lands in the 1500s and if they were to relinquish those lands, then there would not be USA, Canada, Australia, Russia and many EU countries etc etc etc) we can not come to a just solution.

Since the occurance of this conflict many efforts were made by the United Nations, USA, UK, Turkiye and to some parts with Greece, but a just settlement has not been met to this day, with continual rejections by the Greek Cypriot Government as they have the international upper-hand, with the world public already made to think that Turks out of no reason and due to pure agression invaded the island in 1974, with the Operation Atilla, which infact stopped the ethnic clashes on the island and prevented the undergoings of an ethnic cleansing, bringing relative peace.

The latest such effort was the 2004 United Nations sponsered-supported-organized plan to reunify the island, settling the claims of boths sides and bringing peace to this long lasting conflict. The then Secretary General of United Nations Mr. Koffi Annan worked for months to plan, detail and write out a thousands of pages long agreement, continually speaking with both the Turkish and Greek sides of the island, taking their concerns and demands in view and presenting an agreement to both sides.

The agreement calling both sides to make concessions of the islands communities and presenting a win-win scenario for both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities on the island, unifying the island in a federation. This peace plan by the UN was set to be voted in independent referendum on both sides of the islan at the same time.

Besides the UN, USA, UK and European Union supported this peace plan, EU even stating that they will like to see the island unified and be admitted into the EU as a whole, and further commenting that if this peace deal does not go thru, they will hesitate to take in any part of the island and start political and economic ties with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

In April 2004, both sides of the island went to referendum, with the majority of the Turkish side accepting it and the majority of Greek side rejecting it:

25 April 2004 — The United Nations says it will close the office of its peace envoy in Cyprus following the overwhelming rejection by Greek Cypriots of a UN plan to reunify the divided island. Meanwhile, the United States and senior European Union officials are expressing disappointment about the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots.
In a referendum yesterday, more than 75 percent of Greek Cypriot voters voted against the UN plan to end the 30-year division of the island. In a separate vote on the northern side of the island, nearly 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots supported the UN plan.
rferl.org/featuresarticle…13BEBF08E.html
guardian.co.uk/world/2004….unitednations
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3656553.stm
euractiv.com/en/enlargeme…article-109929

Against this latest development, the Greek side while rejecting the peace plan, got admitted into the EU, on the other hand the political and economic isolation of Turkish Republic of Norhern Cyprus is continuing, with EU not following on their promised words, been recognized only by Turkiye.

Although, recently we are seeing various countries from EU and other geographies establishing political and economic ties with Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with representatives/consulates opened in Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kirgizistan, USA, UK, EU (Brussels), UAE, Pakistan, Qatar and Italy, paving the way for her international recognition and perhaps in time been a member of the United Nations, despite great protest and boycott by the Greek side.

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